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An Empirical Investigation of the UK Stock Market Response to 
the Implementation of SSAP 20 “Foreign Currency Translation”1
George Iatridis, Nathan Joseph 
Abstract
This study presents an empirical investigation of the UK stock market response to the im-
plementation of the UK Statement of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAP) No. 20 “Foreign Cur-
rency Translation” (issued in April 1983). Such an empirical investigation has not yet been under-
taken for the UK. Our results show that the stock market generally appeared to have anticipated 
the implementation of SSAP 20. For the aggregate set of adopters, we found a positive stock mar-
ket response in the official year of adoption, reflecting the appreciation of the income-stabilising 
effects of the standard. This paper also presents a cross-sectional analysis that tests for a relation-
ship between the stock returns and the accounting measures of those firms that adopted SSAP 20. 
We found a significant relation between the stock returns and the related accounting measures in 
the actual adoption period of the aggregate set of adopters. This study generally focuses on the 
interpretation of the financial impacts of the various accounting choices of firms within their fi-
nancial and economic environments.  
Key words: Translation gains and losses; SSAP 20; Early, normal and late adopters; 
Stock market reaction. 
1. Introduction
SSAP 20 gives guidance to UK firms with regards to the financial reporting of foreign 
exchange. According to SSAP 20, translation gains and losses should be recorded in the balance 
sheet. This kind of accounting treatment would tend to stabilise the income statement (see Soo and 
Soo, 1994). Before the issue of SSAP 20, there was no clear regulatory framework in the UK 
about the recognition and disclosure of translation differences in the financial statements. This 
tended to result in the discretionary treatment of translation gains and losses and income-
smoothing (see Brayshaw and Eldin, 1989). The recognition of translation gains and losses in the 
balance sheet would make earnings less volatile and would therefore tend to reduce the risk of 
bankruptcy or debt covenant violation (see Holthausen, 1990). Overall, SSAP 20 would tend to 
stabilise the profit figure and also to improve the firms’ financial position, which would in turn 
favourably affect the management payout and stock returns (see Matsunaga, 1995).  
Fig. 1. Bank of England Multilateral Sterling Index 1 March 1982 to 1 April 1985  
                                                          
1 The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support provided by the Economic & Social Research Council (ESRC) 
of the United Kingdom for carrying out this research. The ESRC is not responsible for any statements in this study. 
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Figure 1 describes the behaviour of the UK pound for the period under analysis. It re-
lies on the Bank of England multilateral sterling (pound) index and shows that the pound 
overall displayed a depreciation over the entire period.  
Accounting policy choice is associated with issues regarding compensation, debt 
covenant arrangements and stock returns (see Fields, Lys and Vincent, 2001). According to 
the agency theory (see Jensen and Meckling, 1976), firms may influence or manipulate their 
financial accounting numbers in order to improve their picture and performance (see Healy, 
1985; Lambert, 2001). This implies that firms may delay the adoption of SSAP 20, and thus 
the recognition of translation differences in the balance sheet, until they meet certain financial 
objectives or their profit figures improve. In the decision-making process of firms, the condi-
tions of the UK economy should be taken into account. Over the period of the study, we ob-
served that the UK pound tended to depreciate (see Figure 1). The depreciation of the pound 
could in fact defer the adoption of the standard since most UK firms had exhibited an over-
seas positive net asset balance1. In general, the analysis shows that most firms adopted SSAP 
20 before or on the official issue period. 
This paper investigates the extent to which the stock market responded to the adop-
tion/deferral of adoption of the standard by attributing some value to the stock prices of those 
firms. Notice that the stock market reaction can well reflect the perception of the stock market 
regarding the impact of the adoption/non-adoption of the standard on firms’ financial results. Since 
managers are also concerned about the stock market’s perception of the impact of the standard on 
the financial results (see Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Levitt, 1998), a favourable stock market 
response provides some endorsement of the actions of managers and therefore of the appropriate-
ness of the timing of the adoption. The examination of the stock market’s response is undertaken 
by analysing the abnormal returns for the firms in the sample. We also investigate whether there is 
a connection between the financial characteristics of the firms and the observed abnormal returns. 
The finding of a connection would imply that the stock market behaviour relates to the perception 
of the market about the impact of the adoption/non-adoption of the standard on the financial results 
of the firms.  
The US accounting literature regarding the accounting treatment of translation gains and 
losses shows that the US stock market responded negatively to SFAS 8 (see Wilner, 1982; Ayres and 
Rodgers, 1994; Bazaz and Senteney, 1995). SFAS 8 advocated that such FX differences should be 
recorded in the P&L. In contrast, SFAS 52, which argued that translation gains and losses should be 
disclosed in the balance sheet, was greeted positively by the stock market (Ziebart and Kim, 1987; 
Kim and Ziebart, 1991). Despite the positive US stock market response to SFAS 52, the UK stock 
market might not respond in a similar manner despite the similarities between SSAP 20 and SFAS 
52. This may be because of the differences in the economic, financial and regulatory environments. 
To ensure that the empirical results are pertinent, we test the null hypothesis that the stock market did 
not respond to the implementation of SSAP 20. This hypothesis presupposes either that the stock 
market had already impounded the information into the stock prices or that managers had managed 
the timing of adoption so as to have minimal effects on stock prices.  
Section 2 presents the data sets and the research hypotheses of the study. Section 3 de-
scribes the event study analysis that we undertake in this paper. Section 4 presents the model that 
we use to calculate the abnormal returns. Section 5 describes the theoretical and empirical consid-
erations that are associated with the event study analysis. Sections 6 and 7 describe and interpret 
the stock market response to the implementation of SSAP 20. Section 8 presents the results of the 
cross sectional analysis. The conclusions of the study are presented in Section 9.  
                                                          
1 The details below show the percentages of adopters that exhibited translation gains for the period from 1981 to 1985. In 
general, the percentage of late adopters that displayed translation gains tended to be larger relative to other types of adopters. 
Firm type/year  1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 
Early adopters 73% 82% 82% 82% 
Normal adopters 82% 91% 69% 77% 
Late adopters 85% 90% 97% 94% 
The official period of adoption was from 1 April 1983 to 31 March 1984. 
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2. Data Sets and Research Hypotheses
The companies’ annual financial statements could not be obtained in their physical form 
for the period under investigation, so we used the Microfiche service at the Manchester Business 
School (MBS) to generate the data for the model. This service provides miniaturised exact copies 
of the notes to the published accounts and the exact accounting entries for translation differences 
in the original published accounts. This information allowed us to identify the timing of adoption 
of each firm and to select the control sample. Once the firms were identified, we matched them 
with their stock prices and their reported financial results. Both datasets were taken from Data-
Stream1. The samples exclude financial institutions, such as banks and insurance companies, as 
their accounting measures may have different meanings compared to those of industrial firms. The 
firms in the samples are from a number of industries including textile, retail, chemical and electri-
cal firms (see Appendix 1). The accounting measures that we used in the analysis are presented in 
Appendix 2.  
The analysis covers the period from 1 April 1981 to 31 March 1985. For this period, the 
full data set consists of 114 industrial companies, whose shares were listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. SSAP 20 became officially operational on 1 April 1983. The analysis therefore centres 
on the recommended period of adoption, i.e. from 1 April 1983 to 31 March 1984. In particular, 
for each accounting year that is analysed, only those firms that have actually adopted in that par-
ticular year are incorporated in the analysis. In this case, the adopters are divided into 1982/83 
(early), 1983/84 (normal) and 1984/85 (late) adopters, and are analysed separately in relation to 
the period of their actual adoption. Using the MBS Microfiche service, we identified 56 firms that 
adopted SSAP 20 in the period of 1 April 1982 – 31 March 1983 (early adopters). Only 22 firms 
adopted the standard in the official year of adoption, i.e. 1 April 1983 – 31 March 1984 (normal 
adopters). Also, a number of firms – 36 – did not adopt SSAP 20 in the official period of adoption. 
These firms adopted the standard in a later period and particularly in the period from 1 April 1984 
to 31 March 1985 (late adopters). Also, a supplementary set of tests is provided, where the analysis 
focuses on the whole set of (114) adopters. This additional analysis seeks to assess the robustness 
of the financial characteristics of adopters in relation to the hypothesised relations. We also use the 
control sample of 95 firms for further validation purposes.  
The accounting and stock price measures that are employed to test the research hypotheses 
are intended to explain the decision-making process of firms2. The hypotheses that are tested in the 
attempt to identify the stock market response to the implementation of SSAP 20 are the following:  
H0: 1 The stock market did not respond to the implementation of SSAP 20. The alternative 
hypothesis is that the stock market was conscious of the implications of SSAP 20 and therefore did 
respond to its implementation.  
H0: 2 The stock market did not anticipate the implementation of SSAP 20. The alternative 
hypothesis is that the stock market was aware of the implications of SSAP 20 and thus anticipated 
its implementation.  
H0: 3 The adoption of the standard has no effect on firms’ stock returns and given an in-
significant market response, there is no relation between the CAR and the financial accounting 
measures. The alternative hypothesis is that following the income-stabilising effects of SSAP 20, 
we predict a positive stock market response, i.e. a positive CAR, provided a firm adopts. We expect 
an association between the positive stock market response and the related accounting measures on 
the assumption that the information regarding the timing of the actual adoption is reflected on the 
stock returns. 
 3. Event Study Analysis
The event study analysis attempts to study how a specific event can affect the market 
value and the performance of a firm or set of firms. The event window regards the accounting pe-
                                                          
1 For the period under investigation, the data available on the MBS Microfiche service and DataStream as well as the disclosure 
of accounting information in the financial statements were limited. As a result, this reduced the sample size to 114 firms. 
2 However, the behaviour of firms may not always be observable, and therefore it may give rise to different interpretations. 
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riod 1983/84, which is actually the period of the official adoption of SSAP 20. In our time series 
analysis, we identify the stock market response to SSAP 20 in relation to 1982/83 (early – pre-
event), 1983/84 (normal) and 1984/85 (late – post event) adopters. We have selected 1981/82 as 
the estimation period, because it is relatively close to the event period and the related stock returns 
are supposed not to be affected yet by the events around the official adoption period. The period, 
1981/82, was also used in the analysis as a pre-actual adoption period for the 1982/83 adopters in 
the attempt to identify any patterns in the market behaviour concerning the specific category of 
adopters. 
In the case of a non-zero correlation between the stock returns and the event dates, the es-
timation of the model parameters within periods outside the event could increase the possibility of 
bias among the estimates (see Thompson, 1985). However, it should be noted that it is rather hard 
to identify a completely “clean” estimation period mainly due to the fact that the stock market 
could have built in its own expectations in regard to the timing of the adoption and the adoption 
issue in general. These expectations may be affected by or result from the related exposure drafts1
and press announcements, which preceded the official issue of SSAP 20. We have also used the 
period of 1 April 1982 – 31 March 1983 as an additional estimation period in order to assess 
whether it better captures the specific event2. The statistical inferences based on both estimation 
periods are generally similar. Finally, we have accounted for thin trading and size effect. In fact, it 
was found that there is no significant size effect. As described in Section 5.1, we have used the 
Dimson aggregate coefficients estimator (Dimson, 1979) to deal with thin trading. The empirical 
analysis has been based on daily data, which has been found, that can lead to more powerful and 
less biased results (Dimson and Marsh, 1986) 
4. Calculation of Abnormal Returns – Market Model
In order to measure the impact of a specific event on firms’ stock returns, the cumulative 
abnormal excess return (CAR) is computed. The CAR is used to deal with the case where there is 
uncertainty concerning the precise date of the event. The CAR should be calculated for each firm 
in the sample and for each accounting period around the event window. In addition, to estimate the 
abnormal returns one needs to select a certain market index. Each market index can consist of dif-
ferent types of securities, and different weighting may apply to each type of the involved compo-
nents. The market index that is used in the specific research is the Financial Times All-Share Index 
that was obtained from Datastream. Further, in the specific study, we make use of logarithmic re-
turns as opposed to discrete returns. It is evident, that the logarithmic returns tend to follow the 
normal distribution and thus they are in consistency with standard econometric methods. The un-
derlying formulae for the calculation of logarithmic and discrete returns are respectively as follows 
(Strong, 1992, p. 535):  
? ?? ?1/log ??? jtjtjtjt PDPR , (1) 
1
1
?
????
jt
jtjtjt
jt
P
PDP
R , (2) 
where  jtP is the price of security j at the end of period t;
jtD is the dividend paid during period t;
1?jtP is the price of security j at the end of period t-1, adjusted for any  
                                                          
1 The exposure drafts, which preceded the issue of SSAP 20 (1983), are ED 16 “Supplement to Extraordinary Items and 
Prior Year Adjustments” (1975), ED 21 “Accounting for Foreign Currency Transactions” (1977) and ED 27 “Accounting 
for Foreign Currency Translations” (1980). 
2 Ball and Brown (1968) argue that the appropriate period to estimate the abnormal returns should be the period over which 
the expectations are built, usually one accounting period before the event date. 
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capitalisations in order to make it comparable with jtP .
In order to obtain the abnormal return, we have employed the market model in the analy-
sis. According to the accounting literature, the market model seems to be the most popular model 
employed in event studies for the computation of abnormal returns. The market model assumes 
that returns can be obtained as follows:  
jtmtjjjt uRR ??? ?? , (3) 
where  jtR is the return on security j in period t;
j? is the intercept for security j;
j? is the systematic risk of security j in relation to the market index;  
mtR is the return of the stock market in period t;
jtu is a random error, which is assumed to have a mean of zero and no  
correlation with mtR .
The above equation categorises jtR into a systematic factor that is linearly related to mtR
and an unsystematic factor jtu , which has no correlation with mtR . In fact, the effect of firm-
specific events tends to be associated with the unsystematic factor, jtu since it is assumed that 
there is no correlation between the information that is conveyed (signal) and mtR  (Strong, 1992). 
Furthermore, the coefficients j? and j? have to be estimated and therefore the predicted abnor-
mal return can be computed from equation (3) as follows:  
? ?mtjjjtjt RRu ?ˆˆˆ ??? . (4) 
According to Beaver (1981), the market model can result in smaller variances and smaller 
correlations between the abnormal stock returns. Thus, it can be argued that the market model can 
lead to more powerful tests and results. Finally, the method that is used to compute CAR is:  
? ?
?
?
ECPt j
jtu
N
CAR ˆ
1
, (5) 
where ECP is the Event Critical Period.  
The beta coefficient is a measure of the sensitivity of stock returns to the market’s overall 
return. In other words, the beta coefficient measures the responsiveness of stock returns to market 
changes and also the magnitude of the systematic risk to which a firm may be subject to (Chan and 
Lakonishok, 1993). Thus, stocks that display high beta coefficients are likely to be more volatile, 
because they are more sensitive to market changes. The systematic risk expresses the exposure of 
stock returns to macroeconomic and market changes, and cannot be diversified. In contrast, the 
non-systematic risk relates to the exposure of stock returns to firm-specific changes. Efficient port-
folio-construction and diversification can eliminate or reduce the non-systematic risk. The system-
atic risk is likely to change over time as the firm’s exposure to market conditions changes. Hence, 
the beta coefficient that measures the systematic risk will respond similarly and will also have a 
direct effect on the firm’s stock returns. Moreover, the higher the beta is, the higher the return the 
investors are likely to require as a compensation for the higher risk they are willing to bear. In re-
gard to the relationship between stock returns and risk, Sharpe and Cooper (1972) reported that 
this relationship is not always linear; they have found that for the higher risk groups, the risk 
tended to decline slightly. Similarly, Black et al. (1972) observed a positive linear relationship 
between monthly excess returns and risk, although the intercept tended to be higher than the zero 
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value. Further, McEnally (1974) has found that stocks with high betas tended to exhibit high posi-
tive skewness. This could be explained by the fact that stocks that display high risk and high posi-
tive skewness would be expected to yield relatively higher returns.  
The beta coefficient is calculated using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression 
analysis. According to Scott (1997), the estimate of the beta coefficient that is obtained from the 
regression analysis can actually depend on: a) the sample size, b) the accuracy of âj and Rmt; c) the 
relation between Rmt and ujt; and d) the stability of the true beta coefficient over time. As Levy 
(1971) and Fielitz (1974) report, the beta coefficient of the portfolio can be more stable as the size 
of the portfolio increases. In addition, Altman et al. (1974) and Baesel (1974) have found that the 
stability of the beta coefficient is also dependent on the length of the (beta) estimation period.  
5. Theoretical and Empirical Considerations  
5.1. Measurement Interval and Thin Trading 
Nontrading or nonsynchronous trading – when stock prices are recorded at time intervals 
different from those that are actually recorded – can cause biases in event studies (Campbell et. al. 
1997)1. This may be due to price-adjustment delays or obstructions within the trading process. 
Cohen et al. (1986) particularly argue that price-adjustment delays can lead to biased estimates of 
abnormal returns and beta coefficients. In certain cases, there may be measurement problems 
related to the size of the interval used in the analysis, making thus the stock returns deviate from 
their true values. Chan and Lakonishok (1993) have found that the relationship between stock 
returns and beta coefficients may be subject to change depending on the measurement interval that 
is used. Dimson (1979) reports that the explanatory power of the obtained beta coefficients gets 
higher as the measurement interval increases. 
In our analysis, we have made use of the Dimson aggregate coefficients estimator (Dim-
son, 1979) in order to deal with the above problem, which is otherwise known as thin trading. The 
particular formula does not require a transaction to take place in each return interval or supplemen-
tary information, such as transactions information, and can be obtained as follows:  
?
??
?
n
nk
kD ?? ˆˆ , (6) 
where  k?ˆ    are the estimates of the slope coefficients that are 
(k= -n, …, 0, …, n)  obtained in a multiple regression of the stock return 
in period t against the market return in periods t-n, …, 
0, …, t+n.
Dyckman et al. (1984) and Brown and Warner (1985) have applied the Dimson method 
using daily data and less frequently traded stocks. Their results show that using the Dimson aggre-
gate coefficients estimator to account for thin trading can result in significantly reduced bias. In 
addition, Dimson (1979, p. 215) has observed an increase in the R2 of the model, and also argues 
that the aggregate coefficients estimator can lead to “a more even distribution of the estimated 
betas across deciles of trading frequency”. In order to avoid data-snooping Dimson (1979) has 
used five lags and five leads in his analysis. As he reports, the use of lags and leads in the market 
model has significantly improved the empirical results. Actually, the Dimson method together with 
the use of sufficient lagged and leading terms can effectively deal with thin trading, and thus it can 
result in an unbiased estimate of the beta coefficient (Dimson and Marsh, 1986). Similarly, in re-
gard to our analysis and the application of the Dimson method, we have used five lagged and five 
leading market terms. Then, the Dimson aggregate coefficients estimator, which is the sum of the 
                                                          
1As Campbell et al. (p. 177, 1997) explain, the nontrading or nonsynchronous trading effect usually refers to the case where 
daily stock prices are used in event studies. The daily stock prices that are utilised are essentially closing prices, which are
the prices at which the last transaction within the specific trading day was recorded. In fact, although the closing prices are
not recorded at the same time on each trading day, it is “implicitly and incorrectly” assumed that they are divided in 24-
hour intervals.
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slope coefficients in a multiple regression of lagged, matching and leading stock returns, is entered 
in equation (4) to calculate the thin trading-adjusted abnormal stock return. 
5.2. Size Effect, Data Snooping and Sample Selection Biases 
Foster et al. (1984) and Dimson and Marsh (1986) note that the size effect can cause bias 
and distort the empirical results. In the case where the testing period is fairly short, the overall im-
pact of the size effect is expected to be relatively small. The size effect can introduce further bias 
in the case where there is event-date clustering. In this case, the events are clustered in a particular 
calendar time period, and thus the overall size effect may be different between the estimation and 
the test periods (Dimson and Marsh, 1986).  
Dimson and Marsh (1986 and 1988) together with Kothari and Wasley (1989) have pro-
vided methodologies to account for the size effect. One method is, for instance, to construct diversi-
fied portfolios based on the market capitalisation of the firms. In order to assess whether there is a 
size effect or not, we categorised the sample firms into two groups based on their market capitalisa-
tion. Then, in the linear regression model, we included a dummy variable1, which was composed of 
zeros for small-size firms and ones for large-size firms. Finally, the dummy variable was placed 
along with the other independent accounting variables in the regression model, while CAR was the 
dependent variable. The regression of the CAR against the independent accounting variables, includ-
ing the dummy variable, would determine whether there is significant size effect or not. 
Campbell et al. (1997) emphasise data-snooping and sample selection biases, which may 
adversely affect the validity of the empirical results. In particular, data-snooping biases refer to the 
case where information regarding the data set and test results is used to lead further research with 
the same data set. In this sense, the research is manipulated in order to give results that are the 
most desirable. Thus, the output is biased and not objective. In fact, Lo and MacKinlay (1990b) 
attempted to measure the size of data-snooping biases. The criteria of forming portfolios in their 
analysis were not based on theory but on previous observations of the behaviour of mean stock 
returns. They observed that there was a significant difference in the results using data-snooping in 
comparison with the case where data-snooping had not been used in the analysis. In addition, the 
sample selection biases refer to the case where, subject to data availability and restrictions, certain 
sets of securities are excluded from the analysis. In particular, Kothari et al. (1995) argue that the 
results of Fama and French (1993), which were reported above, were to a large extent subject to 
sample selection biases. Overall, Campbell et al. (1997) argue that biases could also be used to 
interpret those cases where the empirical results seem to deviate from model predictions. In any 
event, however, they should be treated with caution.  
6. Cumulative Abnormal Returns – Stock Market Response  
6.1. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the CARs. The Student t-statistics indicates 
that the CARs generally have zero means, suggesting that the stock market did not respond to the 
adoption of SSAP 20. In particular, when the estimation period is 1 April 1981 – 31 March 1982, 
we obtain a significantly negative market reaction only in the case of early adopters in the year of 
their actual adoption, i.e. 1982/83. Therefore, we infer that for the early adopters, the null hypothe-
sis H0:1 can be rejected. This seems to hold when the estimation period is from 1 April 1982 to 31 
March 1983 as well. The negative reaction that is observed for the early adopters may be due to 
the fact that most adopters displayed translation gains over the period of the study. Thus, the exclu-
sion of those gains from the P&L might have adversely affected the firms’ profitability and dividend 
payout, and led therefore to a negative market response. However, the comparison with the control 
sample, for which SSAP 20 did not apply, shows that this finding should be treated with some cau-
tion. For both the normal adopters and the adopters as a whole, the results indicate that the market 
                                                          
1 It is important to note, however, that in the case where the difference in the market capitalisation between small- and 
large-size firms is not significant, the dummy variable may not be able to sufficiently capture the size effect. 
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anticipated the implementation of SSAP 20, but there was no significant response in their actual 
adoption period. Therefore, the null hypothesis H0:2 is rejected, while H0:1 seems to hold.  
Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics for CAR Estimates 
Panel A. Estimation period 1 April 1981 to 31 March 1982  
 N Mean  Std. Dev. Skewness  Kurtosis  Minimum Maximum 
1 2 3  4 5  6  7 8 
Year Early Adopters     
1981/82 56 0,008   0,071 0,261 *** 1,868   -0,180 0,220 
1982/83 56 -0,102 ** 0,319 -0,374 *** 0,304   -0,950 0,520 
1983/84 56 -0,008   0,493 0,229 ** 1,560   -1,330 1,520 
1984/85 56 -0,023   0,546 -1,135 *** 1,594   -1,570 0,880 
Year Normal Adopters       
1981/82 22 -0,007   0,069 -1,204 *** 3,188   -0,210 0,100 
1982/83 22 -0,189 * 0,489 -1,154 *** 2,730   -1,660 0,630 
1983/84 22 -0,066   0,670 0,560 *** 2,954   -1,670 1,780 
1984/85 22 -0,081   0,383 0,965 *** 1,228   -0,660 0,960 
Year Late Adopters  
1981/82 35 -0,005   0,087 0,165   2,798   -0,250 0,260 
1982/83 36 -0,071   0,429 0,338 ** -0,193   -0,960 0,870 
1983/84 36 0,044   0,587 1,201 *** 1,934   -0,980 1,780 
1984/85 36 -0,129   0,475 0,423 *** -0,445   -0,860 0,960 
Year All firms that adopted over the entire period  
1981/82 113 0,001   0,076 -0,007   2,435 *** -0,250 0,260 
1982/83 114 -0,109 *** 0,391 -0,409 *** 1,585   -1,660 0,870 
1983/84 114 -0,003   0,557 0,648 *** 2,120 ** -1,670 1,780 
1984/85 114 -0,068   0,494 -0,495 *** 0,809   -1,570 0,960 
Year Control Sample        
1981/82 95 -0,007   0,070 0,158 *** 2,104 ** -0,200 0,220 
1982/83 95 0,011   0,612 0,932 *** 6,573 *** -1,900 3,070 
1983/84 95 -0,019   0,507 -0,243 *** 0,255   -1,310 1,410 
1984/85 95 -0,080 * 0,474 -0,368 *** 0,147   -1,520 1,000 
Panel B. Estimation period 1 April 1982 to 31 March 1983  
 N Mean  Std. Dev. Skewness  Kurtosis  Minimum Maximum 
Year Early Adopters 
1982/83 56 -0,014 * 0,057 1,400 *** 2,941 *** -0,108 0,203 
1983/84 56 0,079   0,518 0,469 *** 1,899   -1,333 1,692 
1984/85 56 0,044   0,539 -0,435 *** -0,007   -1,362 0,943 
Year Normal Adopters 
1982/83 22 -0,023   0,073 -0,070   0,018   -0,165 0,108 
1983/84 22 0,100   0,586 2,007 *** 5,860 *** -0,654 2,116 
1984/85 22 0,049   0,370 -0,212   1,652   -0,910 0,832 
Year Late Adopters      
1982/83 36 -0,035 *** 0,051 -0,140   0,034   -0,148 0,091 
1983/84 36 0,081   0,507 0,392 *** 0,806   -0,834 1,577 
1984/85 36 -0,127   0,555 -0,511 *** 2,732   -1,746 1,365 
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Table 1 (continuous) 
1 2 3  4 5  6  7 8 
Year All firms that adopted over the entire period  
1982/83 114 -0,022 *** 0,059 0,581 *** 1,616   -0,165 0,203 
1983/84 114 0,084 * 0,524 0,813 *** 2,358 *** -1,333 2,116 
1984/85 114 -0,009   0,518 -0,487 *** 1,220   -1,746 1,365 
Year Control Sample  
1982/83 95 -0,022 *** 0,076 -0,459 *** 4,876 *** -0,322 0,268 
1983/84 95 -0,051   0,678 -2,058 *** 13,039 *** -4,109 1,651 
1984/85 95 -0,140 ** 0,580 -2,110 *** 9,449 *** -3,350 1,044 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
Using the estimation period of 1 April 1982 – 31 March 1983, we observe that when we ag-
gregate all the categories of adopters (114 firms), we notice that the stock market anticipated the im-
plementation of SSAP 20 and also displayed a significantly positive reaction for the official period of 
adoption. The above findings may very well be associated with the income-stabilising effects of 
SSAP 20 and the related reduction of earnings volatility. Overall, we observe that for both estimation 
periods there is a significant degree of anticipation for the implementation of the standard. The CARs 
exhibit significant skewness and kurtosis. These features suggest that there is some tendency for the 
CARs to cluster although the implied outliers do not appear to result in significant means.  
6.2. Friedman Test 
As the CARs exhibit significant skewness and kurtosis the results of parametric statistical 
tests may be unreliable. So, we employ the non-parametric Friedman test to test for differences in the 
magnitude of the stock market reaction measured through the computation of CARs for each ac-
counting period. However, following the generally insignificant market reaction to the issue of SSAP 
20 (see Table 1), we would expect to obtain no significant results for the Friedman test. We carry out 
the test in order to obtain a thorough picture of the magnitude of the market reaction between the 
period of actual adoption and the periods before and after. The specific test will therefore be useful 
particularly for those cases where the descriptive statistics was significant (see Section 6.1). Thus, we 
test the null hypothesis that the magnitude and the sign of the CARs are similar across years.  
Table 2 
Panel A. Friedman Test Regarding CAR (Using 1981/82 as the Estimation Period) 
N Mean Rank Chi-square 
1 2 3 4
Year Early Adopters 
1981/82 56 2,590   
1982/83 56 2,230   
1983/84 56 2,540   
1984/85 56 2,640   
      3,407 
Year Normal Adopters  
1981/82 22 3,000   
1982/83 22 2,230   
1983/84 22 2,320   
1984/85 22 2,450   
      4,745 
Year Late Adopters 
1981/82 35 2,690   
1982/83 35 2,290   
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Table 2 (continuous) 
1 2 3 4 
1983/84 35 2,690   
1984/85 35 2,340   
      2,931 
Year All firms that adopted over the entire period
1981/82 113 2,700   
1982/83 113 2,250   
1983/84 113 2,540   
1984/85 113 2,510   
      7,120 
Year Control Sample  
1981/82 95 2,480   
1982/83 95 2,570   
1983/84 95 2,480   
1984/85 95 2,460   
      0,373 
 Panel B. Friedman Test Regarding CAR (Using 1982/83 as the Estimation Period)
  N Mean Rank Chi-square 
1 2 3 4 
Year Early Adopters 
1982/83 56 1,880 
1983/84 56 2,020 
1984/85 56 2,110 
      1,536
Year Normal Adopters  
1982/83 22 2,000   
1983/84 22 1,860   
1984/85 22 2,140   
      0,818 
Year Late Adopters  
1982/83 35 1,970   
1983/84 35 2,250   
1984/85 35 1,780   
      4,056 
Year All firms that adopted over the entire period  
1982/83 113 1,930   
1983/84 113 2,060   
1984/85 113 2,010   
      1,000 
Year Control Sample  
1982/83 95 2,040   
1983/84 95 2,020   
1984/85 95 1,940   
      0,589 
***, **, * The relevant test statistics is significant at 1%, 5%, 10% level respectively. 
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Table 2 shows that the Friedman statistics is insignificant in most cases. Thus, the null 
hypothesis that the computed CARs are similar cannot be rejected. Using 1981-82 as the estima-
tion period, Panel A shows that the Friedman test is significant only in the case of the adopters as a 
whole, who tended to exhibit larger mean ranks in the pre-adoption period of 1981/82. This shows 
that the market tended to anticipate the implementation of the standard. Using 1982/83 as the esti-
mation period, Panel B shows that the Friedman test is significant only in the case of the late 
adopters, who tended to exhibit large r mean ranks in the pre-actual adoption period of 1983/84. 
This signifies that given that the period of 1983/84 was when SSAP 20 was officially issued, the 
stock market tended to anticipate that the late adopters would (ultimately) adopt the standard. Fi-
nally, in regard to the control sample, the results are insignificant in all cases.  
6.3. Mann-Whitney Test  
In order to assess whether there is any difference in the market reaction between the 
adopters and the control sample we have utilised the Mann-Whitney test. The Mann-Whitney test 
is a non-parametric equivalent to the T-test for two independent samples. It tests whether two in-
dependent samples come from the same population. Although Table 1 shows a generally insignifi-
cant market reaction to the issue of SSAP 20, we still considered it essential to carry out the test in 
order to further substantiate and assess the information content of our findings. We carried out the 
test only for the adopters as a whole (114 firms) versus the control sample (95 firms). The test was 
initially applied for each accounting period separately, and then for the whole period at the same 
time, i.e. 1981/82-1984/85. We report the results for the estimation periods 1981/82 and 1982/83. 
These estimation periods are similar to those we identified and used earlier in this study. 
The results show that the null hypothesis that the samples come from different distribu-
tions cannot be rejected when the test is applied using the 1981/82 estimation period. It seems that 
the specific estimation period may not capture adequately the particular event. Alternatively, it 
may be that following the market’s anticipation of the standard, the implications of the event on 
corporate financial reports might have already been incorporated in the stock returns, leading thus 
to insignificant results.  
The Mann-Whitney statistics for the 1982/83-estimation period is significant and thus the null 
hypothesis can be rejected. Also, we observe that the mean ranks are larger for the adopters compared 
to the control sample. This is what we would expect, since a significant market response was observed 
for the specific set of firms for the periods of 1982/83 and 1983/84 (see Panel B, Table 1), according to 
which the market anticipated the implementation of the standard and also responded positively in the 
official issue period, i.e. 1983/84. This is also in consistency with the US (positive) market reaction to 
SFAS 52. It seems that the findings tend to be more consistent and similar to what we would expect to 
obtain based on the literature as the estimation period moves closer to the event.  
7. Why Insignificant Stock Market Response?  
The overall insignificant market response to the implementation of SSAP 20 is in inconsis-
tency with the findings of US studies regarding SFAS 52 (see Kim and Ziebart, 1991), and is not en-
tirely surprising if indeed managers planned the timing of adoption. Assuming that the capital market 
effects are a function of the effects of the accounting change contained in the financial statements (see 
also Salatka, 1989), the lack of a stock market response implies that the accounting change had no fi-
nancial effects. It is also useful to note that both managers and market participants would have been 
aware of the implications of the implementation of the standard since ED 21 and ED 27 were issued up 
to six years before the official adoption of SSAP 20. This in turn would have allowed firms to plan the 
timing of adoption and the stock market to anticipate the accounting change effect. If the adoption of 
the standard was planned, firms would have little or no need to renegotiate contractual obligations, or 
hedge translation exposure in order to minimise the effects of the accounting policy change. Thus, the 
lack of a stock market response might be associated with the absence of such costs.  
The insignificant market reaction may also be associated with the efficient market hypothesis. 
The efficient market hypothesis would suggest that if all relevant (accounting) information is already 
incorporated into stock returns, we should not expect a further response in the stock returns. This argu-
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ment seems more consistent with our results and shows that the implications of the standard had proba-
bly already been incorporated in the stock returns. The market response may also be neutral in the case 
where firms are not so interested in translation exposure as opposed to other types of exposure. Khoury 
and Chan (1988) and Joseph and Hewins (1991) have shown that in certain cases firms tend to be inter-
ested more in economic or transaction exposure compared to translation exposure.  
Furthermore, firms may have also hedged their accounting exposure to deal with variation 
in FX rates despite the provisions of the standard. Indeed, evidence from Houston (1990) indicates 
that under SFAS 52, US firms have continued to hedge translation exposure because of the nature 
of their operations and the impact this has on their balance sheet. The finding that in many cases 
the market reaction tended to be negative can be interpreted along with the overall climate of the 
economy for the period that we covered. The market recession that was generally observed for the 
period analysed might have adversely affected the market response to SSAP 20. It is important, 
though, to note that the negative market reaction was in general insignificant.  
Finally, the stock market might have been aware of the US experience and SFAS 52. 
SFAS 52, which was positively greeted in the US (Kim and Ziebart, 1991), expressed several simi-
larities with SSAP 20. Thus, the UK stock market might have been conscious of the impact of the 
relevant US standard on the US corporate accounts. Hence, an insignificant market response could 
be due to the fact that such information had already been incorporated in managers’ and market 
participants’ decision-making and accounting policy choice.  
8. Cross Sectional Analysis  
To further validate these results, we run a cross-sectional linear regression of the CAR 
values on the accounting measures, using the estimation period of 1 April 1982 – 31 March 1983, 
which brings us closer to the official adoption period1. This cross-sectional regression tests for a 
relationship between the CARs and the accounting measures, conditional upon the firms adopting 
and the stock market appreciating this outcome. We test for this relationship for each set of adopt-
ers for the entire period from 1981 to 1985. So, early, normal and late adopters are analysed sepa-
rately in relation to the period of their actual adoption. CAR is the dependent variable, while the 
explanatory variables consist of growth, profitability, leverage, taxation and management payout 
measures. Also, a supplementary set of tests is provided, where the analysis focuses on the whole 
set of (114) adopters. In order to account for the size effect, we split the sample firms into two 
groups based on their market capitalisation and we attributed a dummy variable to distinguish be-
tween them (see Dimson and Marsh, 1986; Kothari and Wasley, 1989). The dummy variable used 
to control for the size effect was included in the linear regression model along with the other ex-
planatory variables and was found to be insignificant.  
The results that we obtain are significant only when we aggregate the sets of adopters, 
where we find that for the official year of adoption there is a significant relation between the CAR 
and the related accounting measures (Table 3). Hence, it seems that in this case the null hypothesis 
H0: 3 is rejected2. Recall that for the official year of adoption, we also obtained a significantly positive 
market response for the aggregate set of adopters when the estimation period was from 1 April 1982 
to 31 March 1983. In addition, the table shows no significant relation between CARs and the ac-
counting measures for the post adoption period, i.e. 1984/85. It seems that the implementation and 
the implications of the standard had already been reflected on the stock returns.  
                                                          
1 We have also run a cross-sectional linear regression of the CAR values on the accounting measures, using the estimation 
period from 1 April 1981 to 31 March 1982. The results that we obtained were generally insignificant.
2 In regard to the cases where the market reaction was insignificant (see Table 1), the cross-sectional analysis has given no 
significant relation between the CAR and the accounting measures, which shows that in those cases the null hypothesis H0: 3 holds. 
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Table 3 
 OLS Regression Coefficients of Adopters using the 1 April 1982 to 31 March 1983 Estimation Period 
 1 April 1982 – 31 March 1983 1 April 1983 – 31 March 1984 1 April 1984 – 31 March 1985 
Variables 
Unstandardised 
coefficients 
Standardised 
coefficients 
Unstandardised 
coefficients 
Standardised 
coefficients 
Unstandardised 
coefficients 
Standardised 
coefficients 
RESFXHMV 0.00053  0.041 0.00009 0.002 0.00018  0.062 
 (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.001)  
BHMV 0.00004**  0.849 0.00064 0.294 -0.00014 -0.051 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  
TRESHMV 0.00005  0.169 -0.00074 -0.109 -0.00220 -0.395 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  
DIVIDY -0.00063 -0.142 -0.00022** -0.897 -0.01544 -0.876 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.013)  
NEPS 0.00036  0.102 -0.00359 -0.151 0.00004  0.002 
 (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002)  
ROSC 0.00054  0.078 0.05207* 0.805 -0.00485 -0.089 
 (0.001)  (0.030)  (0.008)  
ROCE 0.00002  0.083 -0.03045 -0.583 -0.00052 -0.111 
 (0.001)  (0.020)  (0.001)  
OPM -0.00144 -0.158 0.09160** 1.179 0.00152  0.060 
 (0.003)  (0.039)  (0.031)  
TPM 0.00120  0.139 -0.02180*** -1.194 0.00295  0.117 
 (0.003)  (0.009)  (0.032)  
NPM -0.00179 -0.143 -0.14100** -1.272 -0.00733 -0.064 
 (0.001)  (0.063)  (0.019)  
TLOANEQRES -0.00438 -0.034 -0.00332 -0.108 0.14300  0.054 
 (0.014)  (0.003)  (0.339)  
IGEAR 0.00017  0.172 0.00002 0.049 -0.00022 -0.022 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.003)  
TBOREQRES 0.00001  0.097 -0.00101 -0.066 -0.00002 -0.010 
 (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001)  
TAXHMV 0.00100  0.162 0.01053 0.158 0.01589  0.396 
 (0.001)  (0.008)  (0.014)  
TDIRHMV -0.00333 -0.613 0.03548** 0.719 0.03404  0.879 
 (0.002)  (0.015)  (0.026)  
Constant -0.03580  0.09885  0.03875  
 (0.015)  0.186)  (0.161)  
Diagnostic Tests
Model R2  0.15  0.29  0.075 
S.E. of estimate  0.05  0.47  0.540
Model F-statistic  1.19  2.66***  0.490 
Sample size N  114  114  114 
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Variable codes are ex-
plained in Appendix 2. 
In regard to the significant association between the CAR and the related accounting 
measures, which was observed for the official year of adoption, 1983/84, a negative association is 
found between the dividend payout (DIVIDY) and the CARs. This result might reflect the reduc-
tion in earnings, and therefore in DIVIDY, following the recognition of the translation gains that 
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firms had experienced over the period under analysis in the reserves. A similar interpretation can 
follow for the observed negative coefficient of the net profit margin (NPM). The negative coeffi-
cient of DIVIDY, which can be regarded as a growth ratio, might also result from the fact that the 
stock market has expected that there would be an earnings decline due to the recognition of the 
underlying translation gains in the reserves. Thus, this expectation might have adversely affected 
firms’ growth options.  
As expected, the adoption of SSAP 20 has positively affected the return on shareholders’ 
capital (ROSC), which exhibits a positive coefficient. Further, the transfer of the translation gains 
to the balance sheet would normally tend not to affect the operating profit margin (OPM) and the 
trading profit margin (TPM). This is because the former are usually not included in the calculation 
of the latter. The positive coefficient of the ratio of directors’ remuneration to historical market 
value (TDIRHMV) may be associated with the reduction of earnings volatility following the adop-
tion of SSAP 20. Stable earnings would tend to favourably affect the stock returns and the com-
pensation plans (see also Kirsch et al., 1990). Comparing the adopters with the control sample, we 
find that generally there are no particular similarities in the results between the two sets of firms.  
. Conclusions
In this study, we assess whether the stock market anticipated the implementation of SSAP 
20. We also test for a relationship between CARs and the accounting measures. Using the estima-
tion period of 1 April 1982 – 31 March 1983, we found that for the whole set of adopters, the stock 
market response to the implementation of SSAP 20 was positive in the official year of adoption. 
This was expected following the incomestabilising effects of the standard, and also is in consis-
tency with the results of US studies regarding the market response to SFAS 52 (see Kim and Zie-
bart, 1991). We also observed a negative market reaction for the early adopters in the year of their 
actual adoption, which might have been associated with the recognition of the translation gains 
that they had exhibited over the period in the reserves instead of the P&L. In general, we found 
that the stock market anticipated the adoption of SSAP 20 and exhibited a significant reaction in 
the pre-actual adoption periods. For the other sets of adopters, such as normal and late adopters, 
we observed an insignificant market reaction in their actual adoption period. One interpretation of 
this result is that the market had already anticipated the adoption of the standard, and that the ac-
counting impact had already been impounded into the stock prices. Alternatively, managers had 
planned the timing of the implementation, so that the accounting change would have minimal im-
pacts. Either of these explanations can be attributed to our empirical results. However, since our 
findings suggest that the timing of adoption seems to have been planned, the outcome of this ac-
tion would be to minimise the impact of adoption on the stock prices of firms.  
The cross-sectional analysis shows that the case where there is a significant and meaning-
ful relation between the CAR and the related accounting measures basically refers to the actual 
adoption period of the adopters as a whole when the estimation period is 1982/83. In particular, we 
observed a negative association between the dividend payout and the net profit margin and the 
CAR. This may be associated with the fact that the recognition of the translation gains, which most 
adopters exhibited over the period of the study, in the balance sheet might have adversely affected 
the net profits and the dividend payout. This in turn might have also adversely affected the stock 
returns. Finally, the transfer of the translation gains to the reserves and the reduction of earnings 
volatility tended to positively affect firms’ equity capital and management payout. 
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Appendix 1  
Sample Industrial Sectors
 Early adopters Normal adopters Late adopters 
Aerospace and defence  - 1  2  
Automobiles  1  - - 
Beverages  - - - 
Chemicals  5  2  3  
Construction & building materials  6  4  1  
Distributors  3  2  1  
Diversified industrials  - - - 
Electronic and electrical equipment  4  1  1  
Engineering  10  4  5  
Food  3  - 3  
Health care  1  1  - 
Household products  3  4  3  
Leisure  2  2  2  
Media  3  - 1  
Mining  - 1  - 
Oil and gas  1  - - 
Packaging  2  - 1  
Pharmaceuticals  - - - 
Real estate  1  - - 
Retailers  6  - 3  
Software  - - 1  
Support services  3  - 5  
Textiles  - - 1  
Transport  2  - 3  
Total number of firms 56 22 36
The sample of firms covers the accounting periods from 1981 to 1985.  
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Appendix 2 
Accounting Measures used as Explanatory Variables
Growth options  
RESFXHMV  Foreign exchange gains and losses recorded in the reserves to HMV  
BHMV  Book value to HMV  
TRESHMV  Total reserves to HMV  
DIVIDY  Dividend yield  
Profitability  
NEPS  Adjusted net earnings per share  
ROSC  Return on shareholders’ capital  
ROCE  Return on capital employed  
OPM  Operating profit margin  
TPM  Trading profit margin  
NPM  Net profit margin  
Leverage
TLOANEQRES  Loan capital to equity and reserves  
IGEAR  Income gearing  
TBOREQRES  Total borrowing to equity and reserves  
Taxation  
TAXHMV  Tax charge on profit and loss to HMV  
Management payout  
TDIRHMV Total directors’ remuneration (plus pension fund contributions) to HMV 
